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Abstract 
 
The signcryption is a relatively new cryptographic 
technique that is supposed to fulfill the functionalities of 
encryption and digital signature in a single logical step. 
Although several signcryption schemes are proposed 
over the years, some of them are proved to have 
security problems. In this paper, the security of Han et 
al.'s signcryption scheme is analyzed, and it is proved 
that it has many security flaws and shortcomings. 
Several devastating attacks are also introduced to the 
mentioned scheme whereby it fails all the desired and 
essential security attributes of a signcryption scheme. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, and 
authentication are the most important security services 
in the security criteria. The encryption and digital 
signature are two fundamental security mechanisms that 
are simultaneously required in many applications. Until 
the previous decade, they have been viewed as 
important but distinct building blocks of various 
cryptographic systems. In public key schemes, a 
traditional method is to digitally sign a message then 
followed by an encryption (signature-then-encryption) 
that has two problems: Low efficiency and high cost of 
such summation, and the case that any arbitrary scheme 
cannot guarantee the security. The signcryption is a 
relatively new cryptographic technique that is supposed 
to fulfill the functionalities of digital signature and 
encryption in a single logical step, and can effectively 
decrease the computational costs and communication 
overheads in comparison with the traditional signature-
then-encryption schemes. The first signcryption scheme 
was introduced by Zheng in 1997 [1] but it fails the 
forward secrecy of message confidentiality [2]. Zheng 
also proposed an elliptic curve-based signcryption 
scheme that saves 58% of computational and 40% of 
communication costs when it is compared with the 
traditional elliptic curve-based signature-then-
encryption schemes [3]. There are also many other 
signcryption schemes that are proposed throughout the 
years, each of them having its own problems and 
limitations, while they are offering different level of 
security services and computational costs. 
 In a signcryption scheme, the sender usually uses the 
public key of recipient for deriving a session key of a 
symmetric encryption, while the recipient uses his 
private key for deriving the same session key. Exposure 
of session keys can be a devastating attack to a 
cryptosystem since such an attack typically implies that 
all the security guarantees are lost. In this paper, we 
prove that a recent signcryption scheme, i.e. Han et al.'s 
scheme [4] that will be referred to as HYH throughout 
this paper, has such vulnerability and many other 
security flaws. This paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 briefly describes some preliminaries on 
signcryption and its desired attributes. Section 3 is 
devoted to cryptanalysis of HYH signcryption scheme, 
and Section 4 provides the conclusions. 
 
2. Preliminaries to Signcryption 
 
Any signcryption scheme ),,( USCSCGen  typically 
consists of three algorithms: Key Generation (Gen), 
Signcryption (SC), and Unsigncryption (USC). Gen 
generates a pair of keys for any user U: 
),(),( UGenVEKSDK UU   where λ is the security 
parameter, USDK  is the private signing/decryption key 
of user U, and UVEK  is his public 
verification/encryption key. For any message ,Mm  
the signcrypted text   is obtained as 
),,( RS VEKSDKmSC  where S denotes the sender, 
and R is the recipient. SC is generally a probabilistic 
algorithm while USC is most likely to be deterministic 
where ),,(}{ SR VEKSDKUSCm   in which   
denotes the invalid result of unsigncryption. A formal 
proof for the security of signcryption is provided in [5]. 
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Any signcryption scheme should have the following 
properties [6]: 
 
1) Correctness: A signcryption scheme is correct only 
if for any sender S, recipient R, and message ,Mm  
mVEKSDKVEKSDKmSCUSC SRRS  ),),,,(( . 
 
2) Efficiency: The computational costs and 
communication overheads of a signcryption scheme 
should be smaller than those of the best known 
signature-then-encryption schemes with the same 
provided functionalities. 
 
3) Security: Any signcryption scheme should 
simultaneously fulfill the security attributes of 
encryption and those of a digital signature. Such 
properties mainly include: Confidentiality, 
Unforgeability, Integrity, and Non-repudiation. Some 
signcryption schemes provide some additional attributes 
such as Public verifiability and Forward secrecy of 
message confidentiality while the others do not provide 
them. Such properties are the attributes that are required 
in some applications while the others may not require 
them. Public verifiability is not a security attribute but it 
can be regarded as a facility. Hereunder, the above-
mentioned attributes are briefly described. 
 Confidentiality: It should be computationally 
infeasible for an adaptive attacker to gain any partial 
information on the contents of a signcrypted text, 
without knowledge of the sender's or designated 
recipient's private key. 
 Unforgeability: It should be computationally 
infeasible for an adaptive attacker to masquerade an 
honest sender in creating an authentic signcrypted 
text that can be accepted by the unsigncryption 
algorithm. 
 Non-repudiation: The recipient should have the 
ability to prove to a third party (e.g. a judge) that the 
sender has generated the signcrypted text. This 
ensures that the sender cannot deny his previously 
signcrypted texts. 
 Integrity: The recipient should be able to verify that 
the received message is the original one that was 
signcrypted by the sender. 
 Forward Secrecy of message confidentiality: If the 
long-term private key of the sender is compromised, 
no one should be able to extract the plaintext of 
previously signcrypted texts. In a regular 
signcryption scheme, when the long-term private key 
is compromised, all the previously issued signatures 
will not be trustworthy anymore. As the 
cryptographic computations are performed more 
frequently on poorly protected devices such as 
mobile phones, the threat of key exposure is 
becoming more acute and the forward secrecy seems 
an essential security attribute in such systems.  
 Public Verifiability: Any third party can verify that 
the signcrypted text is the valid signcryption of its 
corresponding message, without any need for the 
private key of sender or recipient.  
 
 Many of available signcryption schemes involve 
modular exponentiation while some of them including 
the HYH signcryption scheme are based on elliptic 
curves. The elliptic curve-based schemes are usually 
based on difficulty of Elliptic Curve Discrete 
Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) that is computationally 
infeasible under certain circumstances [7]. The elliptic 
curve-based systems can attain to a desired security 
level with significantly smaller keys than those of 
required by their exponential-based counterparts. This 
can enhance the speed and leads to efficient use of 
power, bandwidth, and storage that are the basic 
limitations of resource-constrained devices [8].  
 
3. Cryptanalysis of Han et al.'s Scheme  
 
The signcryption and unsigncryption stages of the Han 
et al.'s signcryption scheme (HYH) [4] are depicted in 
Figure 1 where the deployed notations are described in 
Figure 2. The public keys of Alice and Bob are 
generated as GdU AA   and GdU BB   respectively. 
HYH aims to provide the attributes of confidentiality, 
unforgeability, integrity, non-repudiation, and public 
verifiability. However, as we prove in this section, it has 
several security flaws so that it fails all the desired 
security attributes of a signcryption scheme. 
Throughout this section, Alice is the sender, Bob is the 
designated recipient, and Mallory is the malicious 
active attacker.  
 
 
Figure 1. HYH Signcryption Scheme [4] 
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Figure 2. Explanation of deployed notations 
 
1) The security of HYH completely depends on the 
secrecy of random number r. It does not have any 
resilience to disclosure of such ephemeral parameter, 
and the long-term private key of Alice Ad  will be 
simply divulged with disclosure of r. The point R is 
obtained as rGR   and it is clearly sent to Bob. If 
Mallory knows the corresponding r of R, he can easily 
deduce the static private key of Alice from an 
intercepted pair of ),,( sCR . He calculates 
),( KKB yxrUK  , and decrypts the ciphertext as 
kxCeM || . He then deduces the long-term private 
key of Alice as nMHrsxd RA mod))((
1   . Therefore, 
the confidentiality, unforgeability, non-repudiation, and 
other claimed security attributes of HYH completely 
depend on the secrecy of r and will be completely failed 
with its disclosure. This attack is feasible due to the 
weak session key establishment of HYH.  
 Although it is believed that finding the 
corresponding r of a specific R is in deposit of solving 
the ECDLP, it cannot be used for concluding the 
claimed security attributes of HYH. Resilient to 
disclosure of random parameter r is nowadays one of 
the most important and essential security attributes of 
any key exchange protocol so that it has been 
considered in many standard and secure protocols such 
as MQV [9] and HMQV [10] that are approved by 
national agencies such as NSA. However, HYH does 
not take benefit of such important attribute and it is 
completely vulnerable to disclosure of such ephemeral 
parameter. Although finding the corresponding r of a 
specific R is generally in deposit of solving the ECDLP, 
there are some practical situations where Mallory can 
defeat HYH and deduce the private key of Alice without 
any need for solving the ECDLP. Hereunder, we 
describe two practical scenarios for the mentioned state. 
 The first feasibility is that many applications boost 
their performance by pre-computing the ephemeral 
pairs of (r, R) for their later uses. This may be 
applied to resource-constrained devices as well as 
high volume servers. In this case, the stored pairs 
are more vulnerable to leakage than the long-term 
private keys. The former is typically stored on disks 
and hence is exposed to more vulnerability while the 
latter may be stored on a hardware protected storage 
media. If Mallory could have any access to such 
stored pairs, he can easily deduce the long-term 
private key of Alice by following the above-
mentioned method. 
 The second feasibility is to misuse the possible 
weaknesses of the deployed random number 
generators. The generated random numbers are 
actually pseudo-random and may have some biases, 
especially when they are generated in the resource-
constrained devices. Mallory runs the deployed 
random number generator of his victims, generates 
the most probable pairs of (r, R), and saves them 
offline. He then intercepts the Bob's terminal that 
would have many transactions everyday (e.g. Bob 
can be a bank while Alice is a customer). Mallory 
considers the clearly sent R in the intercepted 
messages and picks those messages for which he has 
their R in his compiled list. He simply deduces the 
long-term private keys of all the corresponding 
senders from such chosen signcrypted texts by 
following the above-mentioned method. This can be 
considered as a chosen-ciphertext attack. He can use 
the deduced private keys for impersonating himself 
as the legitimate users and performing his malicious 
activities. If Mallory aims a definite entity, he may 
wait until his definite victim sends an R that he has 
it in his compiled list. Until then, Mallory can enrich 
his list.  
 
Although the mentioned attack works for awkward 
implementations of HYH, it is completely regarded to 
its weak session key derivation function that includes a 
simple elliptic curve point multiplication and taking the 
x-coordinate of the product as the session key. 
2) An extra chosen-ciphertext attack is also applicable 
to HYH since it uses a simple XOR for the encryption. 
The chosen-ciphertext security (IND-CCA) is a 
standard and acceptable notion of security for a public 
key encryption scheme [11]. The chosen-ciphertext 
attack to HYH can be accomplished by choosing those 
texts that are signcrypted with the same random number 
r and consequently having the same clearly sent value 
of R. For such chosen ciphertexts, we have: 
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                  (1) 
 
Where 1C  and 2C  are the corresponding ciphertexts of 
messages 1M  and 2M  respectively. Expression (1) 
shows a linear relationship between the plaintext and 
ciphertext that can be a subject for several cryptanalysis 
methods such as linear cryptanalysis.  
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3) In certificate-based public key schemes, after doing 
the certificate validation, the validity of public keys 
should be verified using the validated certificates. 
Otherwise, the certificates and public keys can be easily 
forged and the scheme will succumb to the man-in-the-
middle attack. The process of certificate validation 
includes [12]: 
(a) Verifying the integrity and authenticity of the 
certificate by verifying the CA's signature on the 
certificate. 
(b) Verifying that the certificate is not expired. 
(c) Verifying that the certificate is not revoked. 
However, HYH does not consider such considerations. 
 
4) HYH does not consider the public key validation so 
it is feasible to get certificates for the invalid public 
keys. An invalid public key is of a small order resided 
on an invalid-curve that can be misused for an invalid-
curve attack [7]. The public key of user U, 
),(
UU UUU yxU   is valid if all the following conditions 
are simultaneously satisfied [13]: 
(a) OUU  . 
(b) 
UUx  and UUy  should have the proper format of 
qF elements. 
(c) UU  should satisfy the defining equation of E. 
 
 Traditionally, the public key validation is not 
considered in the PKI standards (such as [14] and [15]), 
and the Certificate Authority (CA) just performs a proof 
of possession by checking the user's signature over a 
message of a predetermined format so it is feasible to 
get a certificate for an invalid public key if the public 
key validation is not considered. Antipa et al. [13] 
demonstrated how to get a certificate for an invalid 
public key when CA uses the ECDSA. In HYH, the CA 
does not verify whether each entity really possesses the 
corresponding private key of its claimed public key or 
not. Such shortcoming exposes it to the mentioned 
vulnerability. 
 
5) The delivery confirmation or a receipt from the 
recipient is necessary for some applications. Although 
HYH is a one-pass scheme, the implementer may add a 
confirmation step in which Bob sends Alice a 
confirmation message perhaps in addition to a Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) in which the session key of 
encryption is used as the key. Since the validity 
verification of ephemeral public key (i.e. the point R) is 
not included in the unsigncryption phase of the HYH, it 
can be misused for an invalid-curve attack [13] 
whereby Alice is capable of deducing the long-term 
private key of Bob. Here is how the attack works. Alice 
chooses an invalid-curve containing a point iW  of small 
order ig . She uses iW  instead of R, proceeds the 
signcryption, and sends ),,( sCWi  to Bob. 
Consequently, Bob computes ),( KKiB yxWdK   
and performs the unsigncryption. Finally, when Bob 
sends the confirmation message M' and its 
corresponding tag )(MMACz
Kx
  to Alice, due to the 
small order of point iW , Alice can easily determine a 
point  iWK  satisfying )(MMACz Kx   . Hence, 
with 2
ig  number of trials, Alice can find 22 Bgg
dd
i
i
 . 
She selects other iW  points of different orders ig , and 
repeats the above-mentioned procedure. The orders of 
selected iW  points should be relatively prime so we 
should have jigg ji  ,1),gcd( . Such points can 
be selected from different invalid-curves. Each round of 
attack gives 22 Bgg
dd
i
i
 . Ultimately, Alice finds the 
private key of Bob using the Chinese Remainder 
Theorem (CRT) [12] while Bob is unaware that such an 
attack is taking place.  
 
6) HYH is vulnerable to the Unknown Key-Share 
(UKS) attack. In an UKS attack [16], two parties 
compute the same session key but have different views 
of their peers in the key exchange. In an UKS attack, an 
adversary interferes with Alice's and Bob's 
communication so that Alice correctly believes that her 
session key is shared with Bob, while Bob mistakenly 
believes that the session key is shared with another 
entity. This can be accomplished whenever Mallory can 
convince one of the honest parties that he has the 
knowledge of the session key. Further issues on the 
practical attack scenarios and the significance of the 
UKS attack is provided in [17]. The UKS attack is 
feasible when a key exchange protocol fails to provide 
an authenticated binding between the session key and 
identifiers of the honest entities. Since the private key 
and identifier of Alice are not involved in the session 
key derivation function of the HYH, it does not have 
any resilience to the UKS attack. 
 
7) Domain parameters of HYH are not exactly selected. 
Practically, there are some considerations that should be 
taken into account in selecting the domain parameters 
of elliptic curves, in order to thwart several potential 
attacks to elliptic curve-based schemes [18]. Such 
considerations are not considered in domain parameters' 
specifications of the HYH that can make it vulnerable to 
several kinds of attacks if the implementer 
unconsciously selects the domain parameters in the 
range of such non-stated conditions. Indeed, to thwart 
the small subgroup attacks [7], the point G should be of 
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prime order n and we should have qn 4  [9] but 
they are not considered in HYH that can make it 
vulnerable to the small subgroup attack. Furthermore, 
to protect against other known attacks to special classes 
of elliptic curves, n should not divide 1iq  for all 
fi 1 ( 20f  suffices in practice [19]), qn   
should be satisfied, and the curve should be non-
supersingular [9]. Such considerations are not also 
considered in HYH.  
 
8) There is not any provision for the key control in 
HYH so the plaintext may be encrypted with a weak or 
even a full-zero key. There is also no checking for 
OK  . 
 
9) Although it is not claimed in [4] that HYH provides 
the forward secrecy of message confidentiality, we 
found it noteworthy to specify that HYH does not 
provide such an attribute. The outsider and insider 
security are two notions of security that are usually 
considered in the signcryption. While the outsider 
security assumes that the adversary is neither sender nor 
the recipient, the insider security allows the adversary to 
be sender or recipient. The forward secrecy of message 
confidentiality is an attribute that is provided through 
the insider security. One may think that HYH provides 
such an attribute since its message confidentiality relies 
on two secret factors: the long-term private key of Alice 
( Ad ), and the ephemeral random number r. However, 
anyone who has Bd  can simply recover the signcrypted 
text and deduce the corresponding random number r as 
ndxMHsr AR mod))((
1   . When Ad  is revealed, 
Mallory who could obtain Ad  may also request Bob to 
compute the corresponding r for him so he can simply 
recover the signcrypted text without any need for 
knowledge of Bd . Regardless of its practical benefits, 
this invalidates the definition of forward secrecy of 
message confidentiality. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The security of Han et al.'s signcryption scheme [4] is 
analyzed in this paper, and it is proved that it has many 
security flaws. Several devastating attacks are also 
introduced to the mentioned scheme whereby it fails all 
the desired and essential security attributes of a 
signcryption scheme. It is proved that the most 
important security vulnerability of Han et al.'s scheme is 
due to its weak session key establishment while it 
encrypts messages by a simple XOR, and the case that it 
does not consider many essential considerations that 
should be taken into account in elliptic curve and public 
key cryptography. There are also other shortcomings 
that were explained throughout the paper.  
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